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ship? Or, conversely, would a breach of the implied obligation on the
part of the shipowner justify a breach by the stevedore of his warranty?
Such questions might be answered by ascertaining who breached his
respective warranty first (a question of fact), or whether the initial breach
is material or not (a question of law) .42
3. If there will be more than one action (and with independent causes
of action, such a result is inevitable) what effect will the doctrines of
res judicata and collateral estoppel have on the second proceeding?
The answers to these problems are not easily found without in some
way disturbing settled rules of law; to find a separate cause of action in
favor of the stevedore could open a new "Pandora's box," causing more
problems than it cured. The Supreme Court, after witnessing the distressing result of its Sieracki decision, may tred with more caution in
Burnside. The fact that a method of recovery already exists within the
framework of the Longshoremen's Act should carry great weight. Its
provisions would be entirely adequate under normal circumstances.
THOMAs

B. ANDERSON, JR.

Civil Procedure-Broadening the Use of Collateral EstoppelThe Requirement of Mutuality of Parties
While driving Northland's car, Mackris collided with Murray and
was killed. Northland sued Murray for his negligence and recovered for
the damage to the car. Then Mrs. Mackris sued Murray for the wrongful death of her husband, claiming that the judgment in Northland's favor
in the first action was conclusive of the issues of liability in the second.
The federal district court agreed and gave her summary judgment. In
Mackris v. Murray,1 the sixth circuit took a different view and reversed.
Although applying Michigan law, the court expressed a strong commitment against such a broad application of res judicata.2
"IFor a brief consideration of this problem, see id. at 444.
F.2d 74 (6th Cir. 1968).
federal court considered itself at liberty to construct a possible state court
decision. The leading case, Clark v. Naufel, 238 Mich. 249, 43 N.W.2d 839 (1950),
refused to allow the use of collateral estoppel defensively due to lack of mutuality of
parties. Other cases, such as De Polo v. Grieg, 338 Mich. 703, 62 N.W.2d 441
(1954), admit that the modem rule is Bernhard v. Bank of America Natl Trust
& Say. Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942), which permits the use of
collateral estoppel by a non-party in the first action, but decides the issue on differ1397
2The
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Mutuality of parties is a legal concept that requires a party, in order to
assert the collateral estoppel effect of a judgment, to be bound himself
by that judgment.
In this case, Mrs. Mackris would not have been
estopped from litigating had the first action been in Murray's favor: due
process considerations prevent closing litigation to one never a party.4

Because she was not bound, mutuality would preclude Mrs. Mackris'
asserting Northland's judgment against Murray. In the classic case of
Bernhard v. Bank of America National Trust & Savings Association,5
the Supreme Court of California broke through the ancient requirement
of mutuality in applying collateral estoppel. There a defendant was permitted to assert a judgment on the identical issues against a party to that
earlier action, although the defendant had not been a party.
Because the language used in Bernhard was broader than the facts
required,6 however, courts and legal writers have disagreed over the
ent grounds. The Mackris court felt that Clark was possibly a stale case. The
decision here is that Bernhard, even if it were adopted expressly in Michigan,
would not go so far as to allow estoppel to cover these facts.
See Spettigue v. Mahoney, 445 P.2d 557 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1968), which faced
the same problem found in Mackrig and reached the identical result.
'Mutuality of parties is not to be confused with the requirement of mutuality
of issues. The issues litigated upon and decided in the prior judgment must be
identical with the issues of the present suit, now sought to be concluded by collateral
estoppel. Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 807,
813, 122 P.2d 892, 895 (1942) ; Crosland-Cullen Co. v. Crosland, 249 N.C. 167, 170,
105 S.E.2d 655, 657 (1958) ; F. JAMES, CIvIL PROCEDURE §§ 11.18-.21 (1965) ; cf.
Finlayson v. Cabarrus Bank & Trust Co., 181 F. Supp. 838, 850 (M.D.N.C.

1960).

' The opportunity to be heard is an essential requisite of due process of law
in judicial proceedings ....

And as a State may not, consistently with the

Fourteenth Amendment, enforce a judgment against a party named in the
proceedings without a hearing or an opportunity to be heard . . . , so it

cannot, without disregarding the requirement of due process, give a conclusive effect to a prior judgment against one who is neither a party nor
in privity with a party therein.
Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. City of Newport, 247 U.S. 464, 476 (1918). See Queen
City Coach Co. v. Burrell, 241 N.C. 432, 85 S.E.2d 688 (1955).
19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942). In the original action Mrs. Bernhard and
others had objected to an accounting filed by Cook, the executor of a decedent's
estate. After a hearing on the merits, the accounting was accepted and it was
held that certain sums of money had been inter vivos gifts to Cook and were
not to be administered. Later Mrs. Bernhard was named successor administratrix,
and she sued the bank, who was not a party to the accounting action, to recover
the identical sums in dispute in the first suit. The bank was allowed to assert as a
defense the original judgment by way of collateral estoppel of the issues of ownership.
s In determining the validity of a plea of res judicata three questions are
pertinent: Was the issue decided in the prior adjudication identical with the
one presented in the action in question? Was there a final judgment on the

692

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Voi.47

extent of the repudiation of the mutuality doctrine. In Mackris the sixth
circuit went to some length to explain why collateral estoppel was not
applicable. It distinguished Bernhard in one quite important feature. In
that case the earlier judgment was asserted defensively; in Mackris the
plaintiff was attempting to assert it offensively. This distinction has been
a point of conflict. The problem may be described as this: even if collateral estoppel may be asserted defensively by a non-party, is it fair
to permit a judgment of liability against a defendant to be conclusive of
his liability to all non-parties who have an identical claim against him?
Judge O'Sullivan, for the sixth circuit, made the following argument.
Suppose the first action filed and tried is a fifty-dollar property damage
suit. Defendant's counsel sends his young associate to defend in order
to give him trial experience, and he loses. Then another plaintiff sues the
same defendant for one hundred thousand dollars for personal injuries,
based on the same acts of negligence, and asserts that the fifty-dollar judgment has established liability and that the only issue for trial is damages.
Judge O'Sullivan felt that this unfairness would likely result should he
affirm the summary judgment." A more bizarre hypothetical case involves
a commercial airliner crash. Numerous death actions are separately filed,
and the defendant airline wins ten consecutive trials on the issue of its
liability. In the eleventh, however, the airline loses. Is this judgment to
be conclusive of liability in favor of all claims yet to be tried?'
Several other courts have disagreed with the distinction made in
Mackris. In a similar accident, one driver recovered five thousand dollars
against the other driver for personal injuries. The owner of the car the
first plaintiff drove then sued that same defendant for his property loss,
8,250 dollars, and asserted the first judgment, to which it had not been
a party, as an estoppel of issues. In B. R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall,9 the
New York Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment for the second
plaintiff. The rationale offered by DeWitt, similar to that in Bernhard,
merits? Was the party against whom the plea is asserted a party or in
privity with a party to the prior adjudication?
Id. at 813, 122 P.2d at 895.
397 F.2d at 81.
8This hypothetical case originated in Currie, Mutuality of CollateralEstoppel:
Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN. L. REv. 281 (1957) [hereinafter cited
as Currie], and was used by a California court in Nevarov v. Caldwell, 161 Cal.
App. 2d 762, 767-68, 327 P.2d 111, 115-16 (Dist. Ct. App. 1958). The Nevarov
usage was quoted extensively in Mackris v. Murray, 397 F.2d 74, 79-80 (6th Cir.
1968).
19 N.Y.2d 141, 225 N.E.2d 195, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596 (1967) (a 4-3 decision).
See McCourt v. Algiers, 4 Wis. 2d 607, 91 N.W.2d 194 (1958).
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is that when one party has had full opportunity to litigate the issues involved and the judgment is against him, he then has had his day in court
and litigation should be closed. Indeed, this is the basic policy in favor
of all forms of res judicata. Yet it does not seem to outweigh the possible
harsh effects noted in the hypothetical situations above.
The question of the offensive assertion of collateral estoppel raises a
problem of differing policies. The original rule of absolute mutuality was
based on a sense of fair play and abhorence of unequal advantage, but it
has often collapsed before the "day in court" rationale. In the face of
the public interest in concluding matters of litigation pursuant to due
process of the law, how strong are the arguments in favor of the limitation exemplified in Mackris?
A potential multiple defendant, like Murray or the hypothetical airlines, must make tactical decisions in the opening suit. The defendant
must plan its defense-specifically the amount of its resources it wishes
to pour into obtaining a favorable judgment-in relation -to damages
claimed, the possibilities of settlement, and the disadvantages of being
defendant (reduced options of venue, of court of jurisdiction, and the
like).1° In a case in which the defendant decides not to litigate as forcefully as possible, subsequent use of an adverse judgment as estoppel in
another suit could work a severe hardship (e.g., O'Sullivan's hypothetical)."" To the defendant, the important factor regarding any collateral estoppel effect is predictability, the knowledge beforehand whether
an adverse judgment will be conclusive in favor of non-parties.12 In a
New York state court or in a Michigan federal court this should now be
clear. Yet in a fact situation like Mackris, in a jurisdiction that has embraced Bernhard without deciding on offensive assertion, the defendant
will be strongly tempted to settle the smaller property damage claim if he
believes the later personal injury or death suit will go to trial. If his
" See Currie 287-88.
" See B. R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 149, 225 N.E.2d 195, 199, 278
N.Y.S.2d 596, 602 (1967) (dissenting opinion), for another possible complication.
Because liability insurance is so widespread, actions are often defended by an unjoined insurer, who makes the tactical decisions of the defense. It is possible that
the defendant is insured by two different companies. A second action may in effect
be against an insurer who was not involved in the first suit (and who was conceivably even without notice of that suit). Assuming the defendant loses the first
action, if that action had been for a relatively small property claim, and the
second was a large personal injury suit, and two insurers were involved, the
injustice is clear.
"2See Berner v. British Commonwealth Pac. Airlines, Ltd., 346 F.2d 532 (2d
Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 983 (1966).
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appellate court should adopt the DeWitt rule, the defendant has a heavy
burden to escape liability for the large claim. First, he must successfully
defend the initial property suit in order to prevent its offensive use in the
subsequent trial. Then he must win the actual litigation with the personal injury claimant. In effect, the defendant must twice convince trial
courts of his case, whereas the personal injury claimant has no such
burden. A further complicating factor is the possible difference in jury
reactions between large personal injury claims and comparatively small
property claims. A jury that is untroubled about imposing liability in
a five thousand dollar property action might hesitate and consider the
issues more seriously in a suit involving hundreds of thousands of dollars,
had it the opportunity to decide both claims.
Often as litigation in fact works out, the defendant may have such
a tremendous stake in the first suit that considerations of collateral effect
of the judgment are incidental. For instance, in United States v. United
Air Lines, Inc., 3 a federal district court allowed the offensive assertion of
a prior judgment against the defendant airlines in a crash case. The first
suit consolidated twenty-four claims totaling nearly three million dollars.
The second suit involved only seven claims; these two suits were the
bulk of possible litigation from the crash. The court said that, in this
situation, the defendant had had a full and fair opportunity to litigate in
the first action and had no new evidence to offer; a new trial on the
issue of liability would be wasteful. 4 Certainly on these facts it is certain
the defendant fought that first suit to its utmost. What then is the principle
of the case--that a certain amount of money must be involved before a
prior judgment may be offensively asserted? If the defendant needs a rule
of predictability, should the appellate court particularize and decide ex
post facto the estoppel effect of a judgment? The alternatives would seem
to be a general rule against any offensive assertion of collateral estoppel,
or a rule permitting such an assertion of any judgment, even Judge
O'Sullivan's fifty-dollar judgment.Y

11 216 F. Supp. 709 (E.D. Wash. 1962), aff'd sub nom., United Air Lines, Inc.
v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 951 (1964).
1, Itwould be a travesty upon that concept [the interest of justice] to now
require these plaintiffs who are the survivors of passengers for hire of the
United Air Lines plane to again re-litigate the issue of liability after it has
been so thoroughly and consummately litigated in the trial court in the 24
consolidated cases tried at Los Angeles.
216 F.2d at 728.
" Professor Currie initially suggested an alternative approach to the problem of
ihe offensive assertion of collateral estoppel, based upon who initiated the prior ac-
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In defining the law of collateral estoppel, the Supreme Court of North

Carolina has been somewhat ambiguous toward the many-faceted problem
of mutuality of parties.1" Our court often has reaffirmed its allegiance to
the principle of mutuality,1 7 but several cases and their subsequent treatment require close examination, using Mackris as an analytic tool, to
ascertain the law in this jurisdiction.
In the face of the requirement of mutuality of parties, a 1958 case,
Crosland-Cullen Co. v. Crosland,1 8 created an exception. A corporation
was attempting to prove that a life insurance policy made it the beneficiary, but the corporation lost in a suit against the insurer." It then
sued the true beneficiary on the same issues. The second defendant was
allowed to assert the first judgment against the plaintiff by way of
estoppel, because the latter had had a full hearing in the first action and
should not be permitted to relitigate, even though the second defendant
was not a party to the original action.2" Crosland is virtually the same
case as Bernhard:a party sues D-1 and loses, then on the same issues sues
tion. His concept was that the previous judgment may be asserted by the one not a
party to that action, either offensively or defensively, if the party asserted against
was the initiator of that prior litigation. This would protect the defendant subject
to multiple claims, but would allow offensive assertions in certain instances. Currie
291-321. Currie subsequently recanted, and endorsed the United Air Lines approach. Currie, Civil Procedure: The Tempest Brews, 53 CAL. L. REV. 25 (1965).
1" North Carolina has long recognized the privity exception to the requirement
of mutuality. If in the first suit A sues X and loses, and in the second suit A sues
previously non-party Y on the same issues, Y may assert X's judgment as collateral estoppel if and only if Y is within a certain degree of judicially defined
privity with X. This exception is quite intricate and beyond the scope of this note.
See Sumner v. Marion, 272 N.C. 92, 157 S.E.2d 667 (1967) ; Masters v. Dunstan,
256 N.C. 520, 124 S.E.2d 574 (1962) ; Leary v. Virginia-Carolina joint Stock Land
Bank, 215 N.C. 501, 2 S.E.2d 570 (1939); F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDUR §§ 11.31-.33
(1965). Furthermore, in a limited number of situations, courts may consider parties
in privity with litigants in the prior action as bound by that judgment to which
they themselves were not parties. Id. at §§ 11.26-.30. This accounts for the references to privity in notes 4 & 6 supra.
" Kleibor v. Rogers, 265 N.C. 304, 307, 144 S.E.2d 27, 30 (1965); Shaw v.
Eaves, 262 N.C. 656, 662, 138 S.E.2d 520, 526 (1964); Masters v. Dunstan, 256
N.C. 520, 524, 124 S.E.2d 574, 577 (1962).
18249 N.C. 167, 105 S.E.2d 655 (1958).
18 Philadelphia Life Ins. Co. v. Crosland-Cullen Co., 234 F.2d 780 (4th Cir.
1956), revlg 133 F. Supp. 473 (W.D.N.C. 1955).
-o It is elementary and fundamental that every person is entitled to his day in
court to assert his own rights or to defend against their infringement....
But public policy is equally adamant in its demand for an end to litigation
when complainant has exercised his right and a court of competent jurisdiction has ascertained that the asserted invasion has not occurred.
249 N.C. at 170, 105 S.E.2d at 657 (citations omitted).

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

D-2 (not a party in the first action), and is barred by a defensive use of
collateral estoppel.

21

Crosland's status is unclear. It has often been ignored when possibly
applicable; in only one case has it been used as a basis for the assertion of
collateral estoppel by a non-party." On the other hand, many jurisdictions that have recently considered cases in this fairly narrow span of
facts have reached the same result as Bernhardand Crosland.3 It would
not be presumptuous to describe Bernhard as the modern, more equitable
approach. 4
The civil use of criminal convictions presents related problems. It has
been generally held that a conviction will not be an estoppel against the
convicted party in subsequent civil litigation. 25 Application of this rule
would ordinarily arise when the convicted is the defendant and conviction
is sought to be asserted offensively.2" In a different situation, Taylor was

convicted of the crime of willful abandonment and non-support of his wife
and children; later he sued her for divorce on the basis of two years'
separation. She was allowed to assert his criminal conviction (to which
she was obviously not a party) as a bar by estoppel.2

The court based its

holding on the Crosland case and endorsed its rationale; however, this
use of collateral estoppel of a criminal conviction is limited to the situa21 Crosland did not specifically limit its holding to defensive assertions of collateral estoppel, except perhaps by implication. Nor did Bernhard. See note

6 supra.

Other authorities concur on the specific point that Crosland embraces the rule
of Bernhard. See Sanderson v. Balfour, - N.i. -, -, 247 A.2d 185, 187 (1968) ;
Currie, Civil Procedure:The Tempest Brews, 53 CAL. L. REv. 25, 43 (1965) (appendix); Survey of North Carolina Case Law: Trial and Appellate Practice, 37
N.C.L. REv. 463, 470-71 (1959).
See notes 27-29 infra and accompanying text.
23See, e.g.,
Tezak v. Cooper, 24 Ill. App. 2d 356, 164 N.E.2d 493 (1960) ; Lustik
v. Rankila, 269 Minn. 515, 131 N.W.2d 741 (1964); Sanderson v. Balfour, N.H. -, 247 A.2d 185 (1968).
The pre-Bernhardrule, requiring mutuality of parties except in the privity situations, is exemplified by RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 93 (1942). Of the jurisdictions that have holdings, this still seems to be the majority rule. See Spettigue
v. Mahoney, 445 P.2d 557, 560 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1968); 30A Al!. JUR. Judgments
§§ 392-93 (1958); 1B J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRcTICE 0.412[1] (1965).
2" Perhaps a cynic might note that the equities are less apparent to appellate
courts in personal injury, auto accident cases (see cases at notes 32, 34, & 36) than
in non-tort cases (e.g., cases at notes 5, 18, & 27). Cf. Morgan v. Brooks, 241
N.C. 527, 532, 85 S.E.2d 869, 872 (1955).
22 30A Am. JUR. Judgments § 473 (1958).
26 Cf., Durham Bank & Trust Co. v. Pollard, 256 N.C. 77, 123 S.E.2d 104 (1961).
The criminal conviction of the defendant may not even be admitted as evidence of a
fact.
", Taylor v. Taylor, 257 N.C. 130, 125 S.E.2d 373 (1962).
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tion in which the convicted is attempting to benefit from the fruit of his
crime.28 As the later case of Moore v. Young 9 illustrated, this restriction
is broader than the Mackris restriction to defensive use by a non-party.
As the result of an automobile accident, Young was convicted of the involuntary manslaughter of Mrs. Moore. Subsequently Moore sued Young,
a claim that was settled, but Young's counterclaim against Moore for his
negligence went to trial. Moore attempted to assert Young's conviction
against him as conclusive of liability issues, but the supreme court would
not permit this. It said that Young's claim was based not upon his own
negligence, the "fruits of the crime" for which he was convicted, but
rather upon Moore's negligence, a separate element of liability. This
judicially defined distinction appears highly artificial. Although Moore's
negligence may have contributed to the accident, Young's conviction for
manslaughter should certainly be sufficient to establish contributory negligence and thus be an adequate basis for applying the collateral estoppel
doctrine.
North Carolina courts have faced other attempts by a non-party to
the previous action to assert a prior judgment against an adverse party
in the subsequent litigation. Although the use of collateral estoppel is
seldom allowed and Crosland is rarely discussed,30 most cases may be
reconciled with the Bernhard-Crosland rule. The frequent attitude of
the court is to state that mutuality of parties is required and disregard
Crosland. A trio of recent cases is illustrative.
An automobile accident caused Gallimore to defend two suits against
him. In the first, car owner Stewart recovered a judgment on a verdict
that Gallimore was negligent.3 1 In the second, 2 Kayler, driver of Stewart's
car and not a party in the former suit, attempted to assert Stewart's judgment as conclusive of all issues of Gallimore's liability to him. This was
the same basic problem as was found in Mackris. Although arriving at
the same result, our court handled the case differently. It simply said
28 See Eagle, Star, & British Dominions Ins. Co. v. Heller, 149 Va. 82, 140
S.E. 314 (1927), noted in Note, 6 N.C.L. REv. 333 (1928). In a suit by the insured to collect for fire loss, insurer may assert as a defense the plaintiff's conviction for intentional burning to defraud the insurer. This is the leading case, and
a basis for the decision in Taylor.
20260 N.C. 654, 133 S.E.2d 510 (1963).
00 See Shaw v. Eaves, 262 N.C. 656, 661, 138 S.E.2d 520, 525 (1964), which
cited Crosland, but used it only to confuse matters.
Stewart v. Gallimore, 265 N.C. 696, 144 S.E.2d 862 (1965).
02 Kayler v. Gallimore, 269 N.C. 405, 152 S.E.2d 519
(1967), discussed in
Recent Developments in North CarolinaStatutory and Case Law: Civil Procedure,
47 N.C.L. REv. 262, 272-73 (1968).
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that mutuality is required, so that one party cannot assert the estoppel
by judgment unless he was himself a party to that prior action. No
reference was made to the fact this was an attempted offensive assertion
of the judgment, nor to the rule of Crosland. s
A minor sued Rogers for compensation for the injuries he received in
an automobile accident. When a judgment was given for the defendant,
Kleibor, father of the previous plaintiff, sued Rogers to recover the child's
medical costs. The supreme court refused to allow Rogers to assert the
previous judgment against Kleibor.3 4 Kleibor was not a party to the first
suit, and should not be bound because that would deprive him of due
process. This case then could have been decided on the basis of the constitutional requirement. Although the court noted this, it concentrated on
the more technical aspects of mutuality of parties."
A third case seems contrary to the Bernhard-Croslandapproach. In
successive suits Mr. and Mrs. Sumner each sued Marion for damages
arising out of an automobile accident; in each suit Marion counterclaimed
for damages. Marion's first counterclaim was nonsuited on the merits, but
Mrs. Sumner was not allowed to assert that prior judgment in the later
litigation." Unfortunately, the only point argued on appeal was whether
Mrs. Sumner was entitled to the traditional privity exception to the
In a terse per curiam opinion the court held
mutuality requirement.
she was not. The issue of a general defensive assertion of collateral
estoppel against a party to the original action by one not a party thereto
was not raised.' s
These decisions and others like them may leave the Croslandholding
in jeopardy. On the other hand, the issue may depend on the judiciary's
use of language. Chief Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court,
author of the Bernhard opinion, later described that holding as the
abandonment of the rule of mutuality of estoppel.29 California, nonetheless, still does not seem to allow the offensive assertion of collateral
3 See also Wiles v. Mullinax, 270 N.C. 661, 155 S.E.2d 246 (1967); Shaw v.
Eaves,
262 N.C. 656, 138 S.E.2d 520 (1964).
3'Kleibor
v. Rogers, 265 N.C. 304, 144 S.E.2d 27 (1965).

"For similar cases, see Wiles v. Mullinax, 270 N.C. 661, 155 S.E.2d 246
(1967) ; Meacham v. Larus & Bros. Co., 212 N.C. 646, 194 S.E. 99 (1937).
" Sumner v. Marion, 272 N.C. 92, 157 S.E.2d 667 (1967), discussed in Recent
Developments, supra note 32, at 272-73.

" Brief for Appellee, Sumner v. Marion, 272 N.C. 92, 157 S.E.2d 667 (1967).

"See also Masters. v. Dunstan, 256 N.C. 520, 124 S.E.2d 574 (1962).
" Teitelbaum Furs, Inc. v. Dominion Ins. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 601, 605, 375 P.2d
439, 440, 25 Cal. Rptr. 559, 560 (1962). This case involved a defensive assertion.

1969]

699

COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL

estoppel.40 If Bernhard and Crosland throw out the mutuality requirement, then the frequent reaffirmations of mutuality by the North Carolina
Supreme Court must certainly place Crosland in grave doubt. Yet in
Crosland the court restated its adherence to mutuality and characterized
that case as an "exception. '41 Whenever an appellate court bases its
opinion on a relatively broad rule of law, it is not expected to list all the
exceptions to that rule that it happens to recognize, even those arguably
relevant. Crosland then stands by itself, a wise exception to an ancient
rule, but one lamentably often overlooked by the practicing bar and perhaps by the court that wrote it.
The sixth circuit in Mackris had to deal with a situation requiring
a mature decision based on relevant policy factors. If mutuality of parties
were not in every case a prerequisite to the application of collateral
estoppel, should it be required in the instance of an offensive assertion?
On the one hand is the policy of concluding litigation once a party has
had a full and fair opportunity to be heard; on the other, is the concern
over placing too heavy a burden upon one party. Bernhard demanded one
result, but Mackris another. The comparable step taken in Croslandcannot be overlooked for its significance and should not be ignored as controlling precedent. Rather than applying a simple, broad rule of law in
this area, the most equitable result-and collateral estoppel is a product of
equity 4 2 --may be reached by a closer analysis of the distinction between
the offensive and the defensive assertion of the former judgment.
IRICHARD

F.

MITCHELL

0

' McDougall v. Palo Alto Unified School Dist., 212 Cal. App. 2d1 422, 28 Cal.
Rptr. 37 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963); Nevarov v. Caldwell, 161 Cal. App. 2d 762, 327

P.2d 111 (Dist. Ct. App. 1958). But cf. O'Connor v. O'Leary, 247 Cal. App. 2d
646, -,

56 Cal. Rptr. 1, 4 (Dist. Ct. App. 1967) (dictum); Newman v. Larsen,

225 Cal. App. 2d 22, 36 Cal. Rptr. 883 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964) (offensive assertion
of a criminal conviction permitted).
1249 N.C. at 170, 105 S.E.2d at 657. See Carolina Power & Light Co. v.
Merrimack Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 238 N.C. 679, 691, 79 S.E.2d 167, 175 (1953) (the
rules requiring mutuality are "subject to exception").
" Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Merrimack Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 238 N.C. 679,
692, 79 S.E.2d 167, 175 (1953).

